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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fingerprint identification evidence has helped shape 
thousands of criminal cases in America. For over a century, the 
practice of “matching” a crime scene print to an inked suspect 
print, known as friction ridge analysis, has gained universal 
acceptance.1 Proponents of fingerprint identification make three 
crucial claims: (1) “every individual possesses a unique and 
 
        †  Senior Lecturer in Law, Centre for American Legal Studies, Birmingham 
City University, U.K. Many thanks to my excellent research assistants Aimee 
Martin, Amna Nazir, and Alice Storey. Thanks also to Dr. Haydn Davies for his 
encouragement and to Terri Smith for discussing the themes of this paper with 
me. 
 1.  See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative 
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1100–01 (1998). 
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permanent set of fingerprints;”2 (2) fingerprint examiners can 
identify the donor of a crime scene print (a latent print) “to the 
exclusion of all others,” (i.e., engage in “individualization”);3 and 
(3) fingerprint identification is infallible and has a zero, or close to 
zero, error rate.4 As such, fingerprints are considered “powerful” 
evidence against defendants.5 
Recently, however, the ability of many forensic disciplines,6 like 
friction ridge analysis, to engage in individualization has been 
called into question. There are a number of reasons for this. First, 
the increasing tally of DNA exonerations has exposed the frailty of 
such disciplines, with invalidated and improper forensic evidence 
contributing to nearly half of the wrongful convictions (exonerated 
by DNA) identified by the Innocence Project to date.7 According to 
Professor Carrie Sperling, “[a]s the number of DNA exonerations 
rises, concerns about flaws in the system have turned to a 
 
 2.  Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for Admission of 
Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 
527 (2004) (citing Saks, supra note 1, at 1087). 
 3.  Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating Post-conviction Claims of 
Fingerprint Misidentification After the NAS Report, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 267, 273 (2010) 
(“The fingerprint literature suggests that examiners testify as follows: Q: How sure 
are you that those two prints were made by the same finger? A: Absolutely sure! I 
don’t testify to probabilities.” (quoting Scientific Working Group on Friction 
Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology, SWGFAST Glossary 12 (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://www.swgfast.org/documents/glossary/030909_Glossary-Consolidated_ver 
_1.pdf)). 
 4.  McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 273–74 (“[T]he third premise of fingerprint 
identifications is one of ‘infallibility.’ Many in the latent fingerprint community . . . 
testify that the ACE-V comparison method has a ‘zero error rate.’ They claim that 
when the method is used by well-trained and experienced examiners, no errors 
are ever made, so that the method itself is error free. Thus, the claim is that 
erroneous identifications are only made by poorly trained or inexperienced 
practitioners. In other words, the ‘methodological’ (sometimes called ‘scientific’) 
error rate is zero while the ‘practitioner’ (sometimes called ‘human’) error rate is 
unknown.”).  
 5.  James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Non-matches as 
Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 601 (2013). 
 6.  Many forensic sciences are inferior to DNA analysis, and as such are 
known as the “soft sciences.” DAVID MCCLURE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FOCUS GROUP 
ON SCIENTIFIC AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM 6–8 (2007), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220692.pdf. 
 7.  See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction (last visited Mar. 
16, 2016). 
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realization that evidence we once thought to be hard proof of 
guilt—confessions, eyewitness identifications, bite marks, 
ballistics—lack reliability.”8 Second, “DNA evidence has become the 
gold-standard” that “has raised the bar as to what is scientifically 
acceptable for identifying a source ‘to the exclusion of all others.’”9 
Third, in 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) produced 
a landmark report—Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward—which concluded that, “[w]ith the exception of 
nuclear DNA analysis . . . [,] no forensic method has been 
rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a 
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between 
evidence and a specific individual or source.”10 The NAS Report 
made some specific criticisms about friction ridge analysis, 
including that it was not properly “underpinned.”11 Soon after the 
report was published, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that 
many forensic sciences are subject to “[s]erious deficiencies.”12 
Unsurprisingly, defendants began using the NAS Report to bolster 
their appeals (and other motions), arguing the report’s findings 
supported a claim that fingerprint identification evidence is 
unreliable and should not have been (or be) admitted against 
them.13 Numerous courts between 2009 and 2011 acknowledged 
 
 8.  Carrie Sperling, When Finality and Innocence Collide, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 139, 157 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014). 
 9.  Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court 
Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 235–36 (2013) 
[hereinafter Collision of Law and Science] (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 8 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report]). 
 10.  NAS Report, supra note 9, at 7. 
 11.  See id. at 144 (suggesting that, “[t]o properly underpin the process of 
friction ridge identification, additional research . . . into ridge flow and crease 
pattern distributions” is needed). 
 12.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009). 
 13.  See Wayne G. Plumtree, A Perspective on the Appropriate Weight to Be Given to 
the National Academy of Sciences’ Report on Forensics in Evidentiary Hearings: The 
Significance of Continued Court Acceptance of Fingerprint Evidence, 42 SW. L. REV. 605, 
608–09 (2013) (“[T]he defense bar nationwide utilized the report as a foundation 
for motions to exclude fingerprint evidence or to severely restrict expert testimony 
. . . .”); see, e.g., United States v. Montalvo-Rangel, No. SA-10-CR-64, 2010 WL 
1484708, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2010), aff’d, 437 F. App’x 316 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(relying on the NAS Report to argue that expert testimony of a latent print 
examiner was unreliable); see also McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 287–88 (proposing 
defendants can use the NAS Report to “refute or preclude [the fingerprint 
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the NAS Report, but responded to its criticisms in different ways. 
While some courts simply pay “lip service” to the Report, others 
have grappled with its methods and more carefully considered its 
findings.14 Overall, however, courts continue to strongly favor the 
admission of fingerprint identification evidence.15 In doing so, most 
courts rely on the adversarial process (i.e., defense counsel’s ability 
to weed out frailties in such evidence via cross-examination) to 
“resolve and neutralize” any post-NAS Report concerns about the 
reliability of fingerprint evidence.16 
By focusing on the role of defense counsel (and the adversarial 
system) as a basis for rejecting such appeals, the courts have been 
drawing upon an “instrumental” value of finality; namely, 
incentivizing defense counsel to prevent errors at trial level.17 As 
Professor Erin Murphy states, “[a]s currently configured, our 
[criminal justice] system . . . heavily depends upon the skill of 
counsel and in-court confrontation rather than out-of-court 
oversight and structural reform . . . .”18 The term “finality” 
represents the conclusion that a certain set of interests are best 
served by limiting review.”19 In addition to incentivizing defense 
counsel, “[t]hese interests include ensuring respect for criminal 
judgments, conserving state resources, furthering the efficiency 
and deterrent and educational functions of criminal law, satisfying 
the human need for closure, . . . and preventing a flood of frivolous 
claims from masking the fewer, credible ones.”20 This judicial trend 
has continued post-2011. 
 
expert’s] claims of infallibility” and “educate the judge and jury”). 
 14.  Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 276–77. 
 15.  See id.  
 16.  Id. at 277. 
 17.  See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal 
Judgments Less Final Can Further the “Interests of Finality,” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 563 
(2013). 
 18.  Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence 
and Our Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 633, 672 (2014). 
 19.  See Kim, supra note 17, at 568.  
 20.  Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to Firearms Identification 
Evidence: A Need for New Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 459–60 
(2014) [hereinafter Challenges to Firearms Identification]; see Paul M. Bator, Finality in 
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 
(1963); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 159 (1970); Kim, supra note 17, at 563; Sperling, 
supra note 8, at 144. 
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This article presents a cohort of cases that demonstrate this 
pattern in judicial decision-making and highlights the implications 
of relying on this finality interest to remedy the problems 
associated with forensic identification evidence.21 Part II describes 
the process of friction ridge analysis, the NAS Report’s findings 
about friction ridge analysis, and some recent efforts to improve 
the discipline.22 Part III outlines relevant admissibility frameworks 
and judicial responses to challenges to fingerprint evidence 
between 2009 and 2014, illustrating the influence of finality on 
judicial decision making in these cases.23 Part IV discusses the 
implications of relying on finality to rationalize such decisions.24 It 
suggests that, in relying on the role of defense counsel and the 
adversarial system to rationalize their decisions, courts are 
overlooking the limitations of the adversarial system, specifically 
the difficulties lawyers have in engaging with scientific evidence 
and the problems encountered by their audience (i.e., the jury) 
when receiving such evidence.25 As Professor David Faigman stated, 
legal consumers of science (including lawyers, judges, jurors, and 
other legal personnel) “often have little understanding of the 
product they are buying.”26 Part V concludes that the courts should 
consider taking new perspectives on finality in such cases, and give 
more meaningful consideration to the issues that arise when law 
consumes science in this way.27 
II. FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: THE 2009 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES REPORT AND RECENT RESEARCH EFFORTS 
When a person’s hand (or foot) touches a particular surface, 
the ridges on their skin leave a printed impression on that surface.28 
Friction ridge analysis, which is the practice of “matching” a latent 
 
 21.  Notably, a similar pattern is identifiable in firearms identification 
evidence cases. See Challenges to Firearms Identification, supra note 20, at 478. 
 22.  See infra Part II. 
 23.  See infra Part III. 
 24.  See infra Part IV. 
 25.  See infra Part IV. 
 26.  DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW 53 (1999). 
 27.  See infra Part V. 
 28.  Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 2005) 
(“Fingerprints are left by the deposit of oil on contact between a surface and the 
friction ridges of a finger.”). 
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print found at a crime scene to an inked suspect print, has gained 
universal acceptance.29 As noted above, proponents of fingerprint 
identification make three fundamental claims: fingerprints are 
unique and unchanging;30 fingerprint examiners can identify the 
exact donor of a crime scene print;31 and such an identification is 
infallible.32 The standard method of fingerprint identification 
employed by fingerprint examiners in America is the four-stage 
Analysis-Comparison-Evaluation-Verification (ACE-V) method.33 An 
examiner must have a latent print and a suspect print to conduct 
an ACE-V examination.34 The analysis phase involves a “qualitative 
and quantitative” evaluation of a fingerprint’s friction ridges at 
three levels of detail: (1) flow, or direction of the ridges; (2) an 
examination of each individual ridge’s unique characteristics; and 
(3) a close examination of the pores of the ridges.35 An examiner 
first analyzes the latent print, then the suspect print.36 The 
comparison phase requires analysis of the latent and suspect prints 
to determine if they match.37 The examiner will study the “friction 
ridge detail to determine if the details match in similarity, 
sequence, and spatial relationship.”38 There is no specific formula 
examiners use to determine whether there is a match.39 
 
 29.  Saks, supra note 1, at 1097, 1101, 1110. 
 30.  Benedict, supra note 2, at 527. 
 31.  McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 269. 
 32.  Id. at 273–74. 
 33.  See Patterson, 840 N.E.2d at 14 n.2. 
 34.  See McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 270–71. 
 35.  United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (2010) (“The first level 
of detail can be used to exclude, but not to identify, a print, while a combination 
of the second and third levels of detail may allow for either identification or 
exclusion.”).  
 36.  Id. (“If either the latent or the [suspect] print is unsuitable for 
examination, the analysis ends.”).  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (“[D]ifferences in the fingerprints do not necessarily end the analysis; 
rather, the examiner must determine whether the dissimilarity is explainable given 
pressure differences, surface texture, print medium (e.g., ink, sweat, or blood), 
and other expected variations.”).  
 39.  Id. (“[N]o set number of similarities—sometimes known as ‘points’—
indicates a match, since it is both the quantity and quality of similarities that allow 
for identification. Likewise, the number of explained dissimilarities—that is, 
dissimilarities believed to be the result of expected variations—is not dispositive 
either for or against finding a match.”).  
6
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The third phase in the ACE-V method—evaluation—
requires the examiner to form a conclusion about the 
prints. The examiner can conclude that the prints are a 
match (known as “individualization” or “identification”), 
that they are not a match (known as “exclusion”), or that 
the result is inconclusive. Both the comparison and 
evaluation phases involve the exercise of judgment by an 
examiner based on that examiner’s training and 
experience.40 
In the last stage of the ACE-V method—verification—a second 
examiner analyzes the same latent and suspect prints in an effort to 
verify the first examiner’s conclusion.41 
The NAS Report acknowledged that friction ridge analysis has 
long “served as a valuable tool, both to identify the guilty and to 
exclude the innocent,”42 and gave some support to the discipline’s 
ability to engage in individualization.43 “Because of the amount of 
detail available in friction ridges,” the NAS opined, “it seems 
plausible that a careful comparison of two impressions can 
accurately discern whether or not they had a common source.”44 
The Report agreed that “[s]ome scientific evidence supports the 
presumption that friction ridge patterns are unique to each person 
and persist unchanged throughout a lifetime.”45 However, the 
Report also found that the discipline was not “properly 
underpin[ned].”46 The NAS Report’s criticism spanned four areas. 
First, ACE-V “is not specific enough to qualify as a validated 
method” because it “does not guard against bias; is too broad to 
ensure repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee that 
two analysts following it will obtain the same results.”47 Thus, an 
examiner is not “proceeding in a scientific manner or producing 
reliable results” by simply applying ACE-V.48 Second, examiners 
need to better document their analysis.49 Third, claims of a zero 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. Interestingly, the second examiner knows the first examiner’s results. 
Id. 
 42.  NAS Report, supra note 9, at 142. 
 43.  See id. at 136. 
 44.  Id. at 142.  
 45.  Id. at 143–44. 
 46.  Id. at 144. 
 47.  Id. at 142.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 143 (“Better documentation is needed of each step in the ACE-V 
7
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error-rate are clearly “unrealistic.”50 Fourth, more research is 
needed into ridge patterns and distribution, discriminating values, 
and items “that affect the quality of latent prints.”51 However, it 
should be noted that the NAS Report itself, and in particular its 
assessment of friction ridge analysis, has been criticized.52 
Courts have subsequently acknowledged that the forensic 
science community has started to take steps to respond to the 
findings of the NAS Report.53 More recently, these efforts have 
continued. For instance, in relation to friction ridge analysis, in 
2012, “a large multidisciplinary collective—the Expert Working 
Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis . . . was 
 
process or its equivalent. At the very least, sufficient documentation is needed to 
reconstruct the analysis, if necessary.”). 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 144–45 (acknowledging that some research has recently begun 
regarding “ridge flow and crease pattern distribution on the hands and feet” and 
“the discriminating value of the various ridge formations and clusters of ridge 
formations”). 
 52.  See Plumtree, supra note 13, at 658.  
The NAS Committee did voluntarily undertake a difficult mission. The 
report addressed various diverse forensic disciplines in conjunction 
with heretofore unaddressed aspects of forensic science. A majority of 
the suggestions offered, such as universal examiner certification, 
laboratory accreditation, universal minimum training, and uniform 
terminology will have a positive effect on forensic science in general, 
even if not fully implemented. Considering the scope of the report, it is 
not surprising that there would be some problematic areas. The 
fingerprint community is not the only discipline that has challenged 
the findings in the NAS Report. Possibly in the near future, the 
National Academy of Sciences will issue a follow-up report with 
corrections, as was done following the National Academy of Sciences’ 
first report on DNA. It is unfortunate that the NAS Report contains 
flaws concerning some areas of fingerprint analyses, but this is a 
limitation that must be considered. To properly serve justice, the 
weight given the National Academy of Sciences’ Report, Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, will have to be 
carefully calibrated to the specific issue. 
Id. at 658–60 (citations omitted). 
 53.  For instance, in United States v. Love, a U.S. District Court in California 
recognized that the NAS Report criticized some aspects of fingerprint analysis, but 
denied Love’s challenge to the admission of fingerprint evidence against him. No. 
10cr2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011). The court based its 
conclusion, in part, on precedent and on evidence that “the forensic science 
community generally . . . ha[s] begun to take appropriate steps to respond to 
[the] criticism [contained in the NAS Report].” Id. at *8. 
8
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sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
and the National Institute of Justice to investigate human factors in 
latent fingerprint identification.”54 Recommendations of the 
working group are as follows: 
The authors recommended that examiners should be 
familiar with human factors issues such as fatigue, bias, 
cognitive and perceptual influences, and not state that 
errors are inherently impossible or that a method 
inherently has a zero error rate. They recommend that 
management foster a culture in which it is understood 
that some human error is inevitable and that a 
comprehensive testing program of competency and 
proficiency should be developed and implemented. 
Speaking generally, and taking the lead from medical and 
aviation research, the authors advocate that fingerprint 
identification would benefit from the human factors 
research and systems approaches to improve quality and 
productivity, and reduce the likelihood and consequences 
of human error.55 
As a result of such reports and scholarly criticism, the working 
group noted that “research into fingerprint identification is well 
underway.”56 For example, “[r]esearchers have investigated the 
effect of contextual bias on fingerprint examiners, the special 
abilities and vulnerabilities of fingerprint examiners, the 
psychophysics of fingerprint identification, the effect of 
technology, and statistical models of fingerprint identification.”57 
Studies have also “been conducted to directly address the matching 
accuracy and expertise of examiners.”58 
At a national level, efforts have been made to make more 
holistic improvements to forensic science. For instance, in January 
2014, the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology appointed members to the newly 
created National Commission on Forensic Science.59 Members of 
 
 54.  Matthew B. Thompson, Jason M. Tangen & Duncan J. McCarthy, Human 
Matching Performance of Genuine Crime Scene Latent Fingerprints, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
84, 85 (2014). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Departments of Justice and 
Commerce Name Experts to First-Ever National Commission on Forensic Science 
9
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the Commission are charged with collaborating “to improve the 
practice of forensic science by developing guidance concerning the 
intersections between forensic science and the criminal justice 
system.”60 The Commission also “develop[s] policy 
recommendations for the U.S. Attorney General, including 
uniform codes for professional responsibility and requirements for 
formal training and certification.”61 The Commission has now 
started its work and created sub-committees working on issues 
relating to accreditation, the impact of human factors, testimony 
and reporting, interim solutions, death investigations, wider 
research, and training in science and law.62 In February 2014, a bill 
for the Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014 was introduced 
in the Senate.63 The Act was aimed at improving forensic science by 
encouraging research, adopting standards, and creating 
accreditation requirements.64 It was reported by the Committee on 
April 9, 2014, but it later died in Congress.65 
Evidently, the NAS Report spurred a series of actions in 
scientific, political, policy, and academic spheres, all of which are 
aimed at improving forensic science (and, in particular, the legal 
system’s use of it). The Report was also billed as a “blockbuster” 
report that would overhaul “the legal landscape regarding forensic 
evidence.”66 Therefore, as expected, defendants started to use the 
NAS Report to bolster their appeals and other motions, arguing the 
Report’s findings supported their arguments that fingerprint 
identification evidence was unreliable and should not have been 
(or should not be) admitted against them. However, the courts 
have largely rejected such challenges, relying on the adversary 
process.67 Part III examines this pattern in judicial decision making 
between 2009 and 2014, and it illustrates the influence of finality 
on judicial rationales. 
 
(Jan. 10, 2014). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See Subcommittees, DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ncfs 
/subcommittees (last updated Oct. 27, 2015). 
 63.  Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014, S. 2022, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See S. 2022 (113th): Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2022 (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). 
 66.  McMurtrie, supra note 3, at 267. 
 67.  Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 277. 
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES TO FINGERPRINT 
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE BETWEEN 2009 AND 2014 AND THE 
INFLUENCE OF FINALITY 
Fingerprint identification evidence has been admitted into 
U.S. courtrooms for over a century.68 In that time, the discipline has 
satisfied both of the leading standards for the admissibility of 
expert evidence, namely the “general acceptance” standard set out 
in Frye v. United States69 in 1923 and the “flexible, factor-based 
approach”70 detailed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
in 1993.71 At present, Daubert generally governs the admissibility of 
scientific expert evidence in the United States.72 Daubert charges 
judges to examine the principles and methodology of proffered 
scientific evidence, not just whether its conclusions are generally 
accepted in the scientific community. In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme 
Court listed five factors that courts should consider when analyzing 
the reliability of expert testimony: (1) “whether a method can be 
 
 68.  Bonnie Lanigan, Firearms Identification: The Need for a Critical Approach to, 
and Possible Guidelines for, the Admissibility of “Ballistics” Evidence, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL 
& APP. ADVOC. 54, 57 (2012).   
 69.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 70.  Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 242. 
 71.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 
(1993); see also Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 242 n.47. This author 
has previously explained that 
[l]ower courts struggled to interpret Daubert, causing the Supreme 
Court to clarify its ruling in two subsequent cases. In [General Electric] 
Co. v. Joiner, the Court determined that an appellate court, reviewing a 
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under 
Daubert should apply the “abuse of discretion” standard. In so holding, 
the Supreme Court limited the role of appellate courts in deciding 
whether to admit or exclude expert evidence, and emphasized that the 
main “gate-keeping” power remained with the trial judge. In Kumho 
Tire v. Carmichael, the Justices held that Daubert applied to all expert 
testimony, not just scientific testimony. This silenced claims that 
Daubert did not apply to the soft sciences. The Justices also held that 
trial courts may consider the five Daubert factors to the extent they are 
relevant. In other words, the Supreme Court did not endorse strict 
application of the Daubert factors.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 72.  Some states continue to apply the Frye standard, or, indeed their own 
specific standard. See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) 
(noting that Minnesota has adopted a dual Frye-Mack standard and explicitly 
rejected the Daubert standard).  
11
Cooper: Challenges to Fingerprint Identification Evidence: Why the Courts
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete) 5/2/2016  9:26 PM 
2016] FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE 767 
(and has been) tested;” (2) “the known or potential rate of error;” 
(3) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer 
review;” (4) whether there are “standards controlling the 
technique’s operation;” and (5) the “general acceptance” of the 
method within the relevant community.73 
Prior to the publication of the NAS Report, a number of courts 
had—to differing degrees and by using different approaches to 
Daubert—expressed some concern about the practice of fingerprint 
identification.74 The following cases demonstrate how courts 
considered the NAS Report in the three years after its publication 
and showcase how finality influenced judicial decision-making. 
A. Judicial Responses Between 2009 and 2011 
In December 2009, Brian Rose challenged the admissibility of 
fingerprint evidence that allegedly linked him to a fatal carjacking. 
In United States v. Rose, a Maryland court ruled that precedent—the 
general acceptance of the ACE-V method in the fingerprint 
scientific community—and the lack of evidence to contradict the 
conclusion that misidentifications were extremely rare favored 
admission.75 The court acknowledged the NAS Report’s use of a 
study that found there was no “available scientific evidence of the 
validity of the ACE-V method.”76 However, the court emphasized 
that the Report “did not conclude that fingerprint evidence was 
unreliable such as to render it inadmissible,”77 and its architects did 
not intend to answer “whether forensic evidence in a particular 
case is admissible under applicable law.”78 In so holding, the court 
emphasized the U.S. Supreme Court’s view in Daubert that 
“[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, 
and careful instruction on the burden of proof” are the 
 
 73.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–95.  
 74.  See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 235–46 (3d Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268–70 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Llera Plaza, 
188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 560–76 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 
2002); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 20–22 (Mass. 2005), overruled 
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Britt, 987 N.E.2d 558 (Mass. 2013); Collision of 
Law and Science, supra note 9, at 248. 
 75.  United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725–26 (D. Md. 2009). 
 76.  Id. at 725. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. (citations omitted). 
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“appropriate methods of attacking perceived flaws in admissible 
scientific or technical evidence.”79 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the NAS 
Report in more detail in Commonwealth v. Gambora in 2010.80 After 
being convicted of murder and related offenses, Gambora used the 
NAS Report to challenge evidence that “matched” his fingerprints 
to latent prints found on a door. The court acknowledged, in 
relative depth, the concerns raised about the reliability of 
fingerprint identification in the NAS Report.81 These included the 
subjective and impure nature of ACE-V,82 the lack of a quantifiable 
error rate,83 and the need for more extensive research to underpin 
the discipline.84 However, the court emphasized that the NAS 
Report had not argued for, and did not result in, the wholesale 
exclusion of fingerprint evidence.85 With regards to cross-
examination, the court recognized some limitation on its impact: 
While we normally leave the humbling of inflated 
opinions to cross-examination, there is a danger that the 
mystique of fingerprint identification, which has had a 
captivating hold on the criminal justice system and society 
at large for more than one hundred years, is such that 
cross-examination may not be enough to rectify the effect 
of a fingerprint expert’s use of such terms as 
“individualized,” “absolute,” and “match” when testifying, 
as opposed to presenting the testimony as his or her 
“opinion” that the latent fingerprints are the 
defendant’s.86 
However, commenting that defense counsel had done 
“exemplary” work, the court admitted the evidence.87 Notably, 
although the Gambora court did not overlook the limitations of 
 
 79.  Id. at 724–25 (citing United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 264, 268–70 (4th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 80.  Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50 (2010). 
 81.  Id. at 58–60. 
 82.  Id. at 58–59. 
 83.  Id. at 60. 
 84.  Id. at 58 n.11. 
 85.  Id. at 58. 
 86.  Id. at 66. 
 87.  Id. (Spina, J., concurring). It is important to note that the Gambora 
decision was somewhat directed by the fact that the defendant testified at trial that 
he “put his hand on the door in question.” Id. at 61. Other evidence also 
connected the defendant to the scene of the robbery and homicide. Id. 
13
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cross-examination, it still overlooked the difficulties a jury might 
have in digesting such evidence. As discussed later,88 there is ample 
evidence that jurors are easily seduced by experts, and as a 
consequence, pay little attention to the veracity of the discipline 
they are tasked with judging.89 In the context of fingerprint 
identification, for example, studies have found that a vast majority 
of jurors agree that fingerprint identification is a “science”90 and 
that fingerprints are the most reliable means of identification.91 
Moreover, despite being a typical ruling, Gambora made two 
important impacts. First, it highlighted that some of the NAS 
Report’s conclusions are confusing. The court stated, 
As our discussion of the NAS Report reflects, there is 
tension in the report between its assessments that, on the 
one hand, “it seems plausible that a careful comparison of 
two impressions can accurately discern whether or not 
they had a common source,” but that, on the other, 
“merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that 
one is proceeding in a scientific manner or producing 
reliable results.”92 
The court felt unable to resolve this tension in Gambora.93 
Second, Gambora represents the first restriction on fingerprint 
identification evidence as a direct consequence of the NAS Report. 
The court said, 
[B]ased on the NAS Report, we can say this much at the 
present time: Testimony to the effect that a latent print 
matches, or is “individualized” to, a known print, if it is to 
be offered, should be presented as an opinion, not a fact, 
and opinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the 
 
 88.  See infra Part IV. 
 89.  See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings 
from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2004) 
(describing how the nature of fingerprint analysis may be taken as absolute 
because of the unique nature of fingerprints). 
 90.  Charles Illsley, Address at the International Symposium on Latent Prints 
(1987) (finding that 93% of jurors agree that fingerprint identification is a 
science, and only 2% disagree). 
 91.  Id. at 19 (finding that 85% of potential jurors agree that “fingerprints are 
the most reliable means of identifying a person,” and only 8% disagree). 
 92.  Gambora, 933 N.E.2d at 61 n.22 (citing NAS Report, supra note 9, at 142). 
 93.  Id.  
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infallibility of, an “individualization” of a print should be 
avoided.94 
In United States v. Aman, Aman moved to exclude fingerprint 
evidence that allegedly linked him to an arson fire.95 The Aman 
court opined that “[t]he absence of a known error rate, the lack of 
population studies, and the involvement of examiner judgment all 
raise important questions about the rigorousness of friction ridge 
analysis.”96 The court acknowledged the NAS Report’s concern that 
the discipline had not been subjected to population studies to 
demonstrate its precision.97 With regards to error rate, the court 
noted, “[W]hile fingerprint experts sometimes use terms like 
‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ to describe the confidence of their 
matches, the [NAS Report] has recognized that a zero-percent 
error rate is ‘not scientifically plausible.’”98 The court agreed that 
further testing and study would enhance the precision and 
reviewability of fingerprint examiners’ work.99 Still, relying on Crisp, 
the court held that Aman’s challenge was appropriate for cross-
examination,100 and not grounds for exclusion.101 
 
 94.  Id. However, it should be noted that the court also concluded that 
“nothing in this [Gambora] opinion should be read to suggest that the existence of 
the NAS Report alone will require Daubert-Lanigan hearings as to the general 
reliability of expert opinions concerning fingerprint identifications.” Id.  
 95.  United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 96.  Id. at 541.  
 97.  Id. at 540 (“[S]tudies on friction ridge analysis to date have not yielded 
accurate population statistics. In other words, while some may assert that no two 
fingerprints are alike, the proposition is not easily susceptible to scientific 
validation.”). 
 98.  Id. (citing NAS Report, supra note 9, at 142). 
 99.  Id. at 541. 
 100.  Id. at 534 (“[T]he Daubert inquiry focuses on the reliability of the expert’s 
principles and methodology, rather than the conclusions generated.”). 
 101.  The Aman court relied on the Crisp court’s view that  
the district court heard testimony to the effect that the expert 
community has consistently vouched for the reliability of the 
fingerprinting identification technique over the course of decades. . . . 
The district court also heard evidence from which it was entitled to 
find the existence of professional standards controlling the technique’s 
operation. Those standards provide adequate assurance of consistency 
among fingerprint analyses. Finally, the court heard testimony that 
fingerprint identification has an exceedingly low rate of error, and the 
court was likewise within its discretion in crediting that evidence.  
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003). 
15
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In 2011, Donny Love challenged the admission of fingerprint 
evidence that allegedly connected him to the 2008 bombing of a 
federal courthouse in San Diego.102 In that challenge, a U.S. District 
Court in California recognized that the NAS Report criticized some 
aspects of fingerprint analysis,103 but denied Love’s motion to 
exclude such evidence against him.104 In so holding, the court used 
yet a different overall approach to Daubert. The court based its 
conclusion, in part, on precedent and on evidence that “the 
forensic science community generally . . . ha[s] begun to take 
appropriate steps to respond to that criticism [contained in the 
NAS Report].”105 With regard to error rate, the court cited a “May 
2011 study of the performance of 169 fingerprint examiners[, 
which] revealed a total of six false positives among 4,083 
comparisons of non-matching fingerprints for ‘an overall false 
positive rate of 0.1%.’”106 With regard to controlling standards, “the 
court acknowledge[d] that the standards used in fingerprint 
analysis ‘[were] insubstantial’” compared to those employed by 
scientific disciplines.107 The Love court found that the procedural 
nature of the ACE-V method—in this case, in the context of the 
FBI—and the stringent qualification process for FBI examiners 
favored admission.108 The Love court departed from precedent in its 
consideration of “general acceptance,” finding the factors only “at 
least weakly” supported admission.109 The court found that Love’s 
argument that the “NAS [R]eport’s criticisms of latent fingerprint 
analysis in general and the ACE-V methodology in particular 
demonstrate that friction ridge analysis is not accepted in the 
relevant scientific community” contained a “kernel of truth.”110 
Thus, the court agreed that the NAS Report “demonstrate[d] some 
hesitancy in accepting latent fingerprint analysis on the part of the 
broader scientific community.”111 However the court did not reject 
 
 102.  United States v. Love, No. 10cr2418-MMM, 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal. 
June 1, 2011). Notably this is not a post-conviction case, but it is included as a 
helpful illustration of post-NAS judicial decision making in this area. 
 103.  Id. at *7. 
 104.  Id. at *10. 
 105.  Id. at *8. 
 106.  Id. at *5.  
 107.  Id. at *6.  
 108.  Id. at *6–7. 
 109.  Id. at *7. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id.  
16
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“general acceptance” entirely because “forensic science and law 
enforcement communities strongly support the use of friction ridge 
analysis.”112 The court concluded, “Friction ridge analysis is not 
foolproof, but it is also far removed from the types of ‘junk science’ 
that must be excluded under . . . Daubert.”113 Notably, this is 
contrary to one scholar’s view that the “‘gold standard’ in 
identification [of fingerprinting] now appears to be more akin to    
. . . ‘fool’s gold.’”114 Cementing its decision, the Love court 
underscored that the state’s expert “will be subject to cross-
examination about her background, methods, analysis, 
conclusions, and latent fingerprint analysis generally.”115 
In Pettus v. United States, the appellant used the NAS Report to 
challenge forensic evidence that his handwriting matched the 
writing on a note found on the victim’s body.116 This is relevant to 
fingerprint identification because Pettus aimed his challenge at the 
ACE-V method, as this is the methodology the FBI also employs in 
handwriting analysis.117 In rejecting Pettus’ claim, the court stated: 
As in all such cases, however, it is important . . . that 
appellant was not denied a second opportunity to 
challenge FBI examiner Maldonado’s expert opinion, this 
time before the jury. Rejecting the view of those “overly 
pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the 
adversary system generally,” the Supreme Court has 
reminded us that “[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction 
on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence.” As the trial judge said in concluding his 
exemplary analysis here: “I fully expect the defense to 
conduct a thorough cross-examination that will expose 
any and all inadequacies and points of unreliability of the 
ACE-V method as a general matter, as well as the . . . 
 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id. at *8. 
 114.  Brooke G. Malcom, Comment, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence 
Alone: How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 328 (2008). 
 115.  Love, 2011 WL 2173644, at *9. 
 116.  Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213, 226–27 (D.C. 2012). This author did 
not consider this case in her 2013 article. See Collision of Law and Science, supra note 
9. 
 117.  Pettus, 37 A.3d at 227. 
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inadequacies and points of . . . unreliability in the 
application of that method in this case.”118 
The above cases119 demonstrated that courts generally 
acknowledge the NAS Report; however, they engage with and 
 
 118.  Id. at 228–29 (quoting Daubert v. United States, 509 U.S. 579, 596 
(1993)). 
 119.  There were a few other post-NAS Report cases that very briefly 
acknowledge the Report between 2009 and 2011. In August 2011, after being 
convicted of first degree murder, Edward Mitchell challenged the fingerprint 
evidence against him. People v. Mitchell, 955 N.E.2d 1180, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011). In Mitchell, the Illinois Appellate Court found that (1) the trial court did 
not err by admitting expert testimony that failed to account for eight of the 
thirteen points allegedly found between defendant’s print and the suspect print; 
and (2) the trial court did not err by failing to conduct an admissibility hearing 
concerning the methodology used by the relevant fingerprint expert. Id. at 1190. 
The court made no substantive mention of the NAS Report’s findings, but in his 
dissent, Judge Robert Gordon appeared to follow the NAS Report’s findings in 
that he berated the experts involved for not making notes of their processes and 
conclusions. Id. (Gordon, J., dissenting). In United States v. Gutierrez-Castro, the 
defendant came before a U.S. District Court in New Mexico. 805 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 
1218 (D.N.M. 2011). In that case, Castro was accused with reentry of a removed 
alien, and the state wanted to introduce the testimony of James McNutt. Id. at 
1222. McNutt would testify that suspect prints belonged to Castro. Id. Castro used 
the NAS Report in a very narrow sense. See id. at 1228. Castro argued that, 
“because there are no standardized methods of accreditation or the necessary 
training to reduce errors, and because McNutt has not taken a class since 2004, he 
is not qualified to offer expert testimony about fingerprint analysis.” Id. Without 
engaging the NAS Report, the court rejected Castro’s argument, seemingly siding 
with the state’s argument that McNutt had undergone demanding training with 
regular proficiency tests. Id. at 1228–29. Like other courts, the Castro court was not 
deterred by the fact that most proficiency tests do not reflect real-life conditions. 
The court agreed that the error rate, controlling standards, and general 
acceptance of fingerprint identification favored admission. Id. at 1232. Like in 
Love, the court found that the testing of the discipline was only “somewhat in favor 
of admissibility.” Id. at 1231. It also found that “peer review” was not in favor of 
admissibility. Id. The court’s overall conclusion, however, was qualified. The court 
gave permission for McNutt to testify, but would not allow (1) the state to “offer 
McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence;” (2) the trial court to “certify 
McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence;” or (3) “the jury instructions     
. . . [to] refer to McNutt as an expert witness.” Id. at 1235. In December 2011, in 
United States v. Watkins, 450 Fed. App’x 511 (6th Cir. 2011), Eric Watkins 
challenged the district court’s decision to admit fingerprint evidence that linked 
him to various crimes. Specifically, Watkins challenged the state’s expert who 
claimed that when ACE-V “is used properly by a competent examiner, the error 
rate for identification is zero.” Id. at 513. In support, Watkins cited the NAS 
Report’s conclusion that such claims were unrealistic. Id. at 515. The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected Watkins’ argument on two grounds. Id. First, the court 
18
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respond to the NAS Report’s criticisms of fingerprint identification 
to different degrees.120 In all of these cases, however, judges have 
underscored the role of defense counsel and the adversarial system 
as a mechanism for weeding out frailties in such evidence. In the 
2013 article, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses 
to Developments in Forensic Science, involving challenges to fingerprint 
identification evidence decided between 2004 and 2011, this 
author concluded that “[o]verall, post-NAS Report courts have . . . 
relied on precedent and the adversary process to resolve and 
neutralize their concerns about the reliability of fingerprint 
evidence in the light of the NAS Report.”121 
There was also evidence that pre-NAS Report courts had 
rationalized their decisions in the same way.122 As such, the cohort 
 
said that it would not consider evidence, namely the NAS Report, which was not 
before the district court. Id. Second, the court reasoned that even “assuming 
arguendo that the ACE-V method is not error-free, the fact that the fingerprint 
examiner testified that it was 100% accurate does not by itself mean that the 
district court erred in determining that the ACE-V method was scientifically valid.” 
Id. The court declined to hold that the allegedly mistaken error-rate testimony 
“negates the scientific validity of the ACE-V method given all the other factors that 
the district court was required to consider.” Id. at 516. 
 120.  See Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 276–77. 
 121.  Id. at 277. This author also concluded that 
[p]ost-NAS Report courts have: (1) made decisions to restrict 
testimony directly as a result of the NAS Report; (2) been more critical 
of the ability of fingerprint evidence to satisfy Daubert than pre-NAS 
Report courts, . . . [but not denied] admission of fingerprint evidence 
because of the NAS Report’s findings; (3) placed emphasis on the NAS 
Report’s position that it did not intend to answer the question of 
whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under 
applicable law; (4) responded favorably to attempts by the forensic 
community to fill the gaps identified by the NAS Report; [and] (5) 
highlighted areas of contradiction in the NAS Report’s conclusions.  
Id. at 276–77. 
 122.  See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 261 (4th Cir. 2003). Crisp 
had been convicted of a bank robbery based, in part, on expert testimony that his 
right palm had produced a print recovered from a confession note. Id. at 265. 
Crisp challenged the admission of the testimony under Daubert. Id. at 267. The 
majority rejected Crisp’s claims. Id. at 267–70. It found that precedent favored 
admission; the principles underlying fingerprint identification bore the 
“imprimatur of a strong general acceptance,” the discipline had adequate 
standards controlling its operation because “fingerprint analysts are held to a 
consistent ‘points and characteristics’ approach to identification,” examiners 
undergo proficiency tests, and the state’s expert testified that the discipline had an 
“essentially zero” error-rate. Id at 268–69. The majority conceded that “further 
19
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of cases demonstrated that finality and in particular, the finality 
interest related to incentivizing defense counsel, significantly 
influenced judicial decision making in this area. 
B. Judicial Responses Between 2012 and 2014 
U.S. courts have continued to draw upon this value of finality 
between 2012 and 2014. The following cases demonstrate this. 
In the 2012 case of State v. Sheehan, the court allowed an 
appellant to challenge fingerprint evidence.123 This is rare and 
showcases how highly the courts value the adversarial process. In 
this case, Sheehan argued: (1) “the trial court abused its discretion 
when it failed to hold [an admissibility] hearing to determine 
whether to admit the [s]tate’s expert testimony that a palm print 
found at the scene matched Sheehan’s palm print;” and (2) the 
trial court erred in its exclusion of Sheehan’s expert’s testimony, as 
well as its limitation of “Sheehan’s cross-examination of the state’s 
experts.”124 The appeals court agreed with the trial court’s 
admissibility decision but ruled that the trial court erred with 
regards to restricting cross-examination of the state’s expert.125 The 
court stated, “In depriving a person of life or liberty, . . . due 
process [is] . . . [a] fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine 
and cross-examine witnesses.”126 “Thus, the trial court’s legal 
determination that the [s]tate’s expert testimony was admissible 
did not allow the court to then impinge on the jury’s role as fact 
finder by excluding the evidence that Sheehan may have used to 
challenge the credibility and weight of the [s]tate’s expert 
testimony.”127 Without appropriate justification, “exclusion of this 
kind of exculpatory evidence . . . deprives a defendant of the basic 
right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and survive the 
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”128 Sheehan was given a 
 
research . . . and the development of even more consistent professional standards 
is desirable,” but found “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary 
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. at 269–70. 
 123.  State v. Sheehan, 273 P.3d 417, 422–23 (Utah Ct. App. 2012). 
 124.  Id. at 420.  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 426 (quoting Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 
1945)). 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 427.  
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new trial.129 By contrast, the vast majority of cases reject appeals of 
this nature and rely on the adversarial process to protect 
defendants. 
In United States v. Stone, Stone moved to exclude expert 
testimony using the NAS Report.130 He argued that the discipline 
did not satisfy Daubert.131 In rejecting Stone’s motion, the court 
found that “concerns about the risks of error such as false positive 
identifications go to the weight of the evidence and can be 
explored on cross-examination and/or through presentation of 
competing evidence,” and that related issues were more 
appropriate for the jury.132 Citing a D.C. District Court decision, the 
court agreed that, 
[w]hen a principle is well-established, the questions are 
simply whether the expert properly applied the 
established scientific principle to the facts and whether 
the expert’s credibility is compromised for reasons such as 
bias. These are matters that a jury usually is competent to 
evaluate after cross-examination and presentation of 
competing expert testimony.133 
The court underscored its decision by stating, “The gatekeeper 
role must not supplant the adversary system or the role of the 
jury.”134 
In Gee v. United States, the defendant appealed his convictions 
for a variety of burglary-related offenses. He argued that the trial 
court had “improperly preclud[ed] the use and admission” of the 
NAS Report by his defense.135 Defense counsel wished to cross-
examine the government’s fingerprint expert using the Report 
because part of the state’s case was that Gee was the donor of prints 
found at the crime scene.136 The appeals court ruled that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to take judicial 
 
 129.  Id. at 430. 
 130.  United States v. Stone, 848 F. Supp. 2d 714, 716 (E.D. Mich. 2012). 
 131.  Id. at 716–17. 
 132.  Id. at 719. 
 133.  Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.D.C. 
2000)). 
 134.  Id. (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate 
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” (quoting Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993))). 
 135.  Gee v. United States, 54 A.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. 2012). 
 136.  Id. at 1262. 
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notice of the friction ridge analysis discussion in the NAS Report as 
a learned treatise, concluding that “although appellant was not able 
to cite to or quote from the NAS Report, . . . questioning defense 
counsel pursued on cross-examination addressed the concerns 
raised in the Report.”137 Defense counsel’s opportunity to conduct 
cross-examination, even without relevant literature, was sufficient 
to reject Gee’s claim, demonstrating the court’s view that the 
adversarial system—even without props—is sufficient to adequately 
highlight fragilities in forensic evidence.138 
In People v. Luna, Luna appealed his first-degree murder 
conviction, arguing that the trial court should have excluded 
expert testimony that a latent print found on a napkin matched his 
palm print or that he should have been granted a Frye hearing 
because the controversy surrounding fingerprint identification 
demonstrated that the relevant scientific community did not 
“generally accept” the method used to match latent prints to 
known prints.139 The appeals court acknowledged that the NAS 
Report and other literature included “direct criticisms to specific 
claims from latent print examiners,” however, the court concluded 
that the forum for airing such criticisms was cross-examination, 
stating, “Before the jury, the examining attorney ‘may expose shaky 
but admissible evidence by vigorous cross-examination or the 
presentation of contrary evidence.”140 Luna’s claims were rejected 
on the basis of defense counsel’s thorough examination of the 
state’s expert—especially regarding his ability to draw a conclusion 
as to the palm print—and also questionable reliability of latent 
print identification given past mistaken fingerprint identifications 
and the subjective nature of comparison.141 
C. The Doctrine of Finality 
The cases detailed above all demonstrated the influence of 
finality on judicial decision making between 2009 and 2014. This 
influence is unsurprising. The obvious theoretical reason for why 
 
 137.  Id. at 1268. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  People v. Luna, 989 N.E.2d 655, 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013), appeal denied, 
996 N.E.2d 20 (Ill. 2013). 
 140.  Id. (quoting Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 330 
(Ill. 2002)).  
 141.  Id. at 674. 
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss2/8
8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete) 5/2/2016  9:26 PM 
778 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:756 
courts restrict any post-conviction review is finality. As Professor 
Sperling describes: 
[P]ost-conviction procedures grow out of a strong 
tradition that values the finality of criminal convictions. 
Finality in the criminal law context means that the case is 
over, with no avenues remaining to challenge the 
conviction. Finality assigns guilt, puts the case to rest, and 
assures all parties that it will not be re-opened. Assuming 
that the criminal process is error-free, finality serves the 
ends of justice. Theoretically, once the system convicts the 
right person and assesses the right punishment, society is 
better off when prosecutors, law enforcement 
professionals, defense attorneys, and judges move on to 
other concerns.142 
The concept of finality developed out of a “taxonomy”143 
detailed by Professor Paul Bator in his landmark 1963 article, 
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.144 
Professor Bator “laid the intellectual groundwork for the Supreme 
Court’s post-trial review jurisprudence and has been cited in 
hundreds of law review articles and court opinions.”145 “Bator 
argued that the finality of criminal judgments serves important 
interests that are harmed by expansions of post-trial rights”146 and 
proposed that, because we can never be 100 percent certain that no 
error of law or fact was made during trial (or appellate) 
proceedings, “we must impose an end to litigation at some point or 
else the case could conceivably go on ad infinitum.”147 As Professor 
Sigmund Popko summarized: 
Essentially, Bator argues we must acknowledge that 
human systems, because fallible humans design them, are 
themselves inherently fallible. Thus, we must “come to 
terms with the possibility of error inherent in any 
[human] process.” The best way to deal with this 
probability of human error, he continues, is to design our 
systems of justice with sufficient procedures and 
arrangements such that there exists an “acceptable 
 
 142.  CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 140. 
 143.  Kim, supra note 17, at 568.  
 144.  Bator, supra note 20, at 451–53. 
 145.  Kim, supra note 17, at 568. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Sigmund G. Popko, Putting Finality in Perspective: Collateral Review of 
Criminal Judgments in the DNA Era, 1 L.J. SOC. JUST. 75, 76 (2011). 
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probability that justice will be done, that the facts found 
will be ‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’”148 
Bator answered the question of why the criminal justice system 
needs finality by considering a series of “‘very real’ consequences of 
endless litigation.”149 Decades later, criminal law is very familiar with 
the notion that finality is not a singular “consequence” but rather 
“shorthand for a collection of interests scholars assume are 
furthered by any restrictions on review.”150 Finality assumes that 
providing defendants broader post-conviction rights harms these 
society-desired interests.151 Consequently, when considering 
appeals, judges must balance society’s interests in finality against 
the rights of defendants.152 Of course, finality does serve the 
interests of defendants as well, including their interests “not to be 
subject to repetitive trials, [and to] be able to move on in their 
lives” and not to be caught by repetitive state attempts at trying a 
case (and its luck) that “wear down the resources and stamina of 
[the] defendant.”153 As it stands, however, the scales are not 
commonly tipped in favor of defendants, with finality often being 
used as a “trump card that presumptively outranks defendants’ 
interests.”154 As Laurie Levenson stated, “The criminal justice 
system is obsessed with finality. While it professes to focus on 
obtaining fair and accurate results, the goal of finality is never far 
away.”155 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, “courts have fully embraced the 
concept of finality,”156 especially for criminal cases, with judges and 
scholars routinely asserting that restricting defendants’ post-
conviction arsenal benefits society.157 However, trial courts’ use of 
finality to rationalize decisions to allow the admission of fingerprint 
 
 148.  Id. (citing Bator, supra note 20, at 448–51).  
 149.  Id. at 77.  
 150.  Kim, supra note 17, at 568. 
 151.  Id. at 573. 
 152.  Id. at 566. 
 153.  Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction 
Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552–53 (2014). 
 154.  Kim, supra note 17, at 573 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About 
Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 772–75 (1987)); Popko, supra note 147, 
at 75. 
 155.  Levenson, supra note 153, at 551. 
 156.  Popko, supra note 147, at 77. 
 157.  Id. 
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss2/8
8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete) 5/2/2016  9:26 PM 
780 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:756 
identification evidence arguably overlooks the limitations of the 
adversarial system. 
Part IV, therefore, will discuss the implications of trial courts’ 
reliance on finality to rationalize their decisions by considering the 
problems lawyers and jurors encounter when dealing with scientific 
evidence. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINALITY: LAWYERS, JURORS, AND SCIENCE 
Law needs science to help it understand “the world in which 
legal policy must operate.”158 As Faigman stated, “Without 
[science], legal policy is literally blinded.”159 On the face of it, 
science and law seemingly share a mutually convenient and 
somewhat placid relationship. Lawyers look to science for certainty 
in the face of difficult legal questions and decisions, and science 
seemingly responds with an answer.160 
However, there is tension at the intersection of law and 
science. As one scholar stated, “No matter how organized and 
thorough scientific theories reach, they simply cannot foresee and 
solve every case or legal problem.”161 Law and science clash 
culturally because of their different approaches to the world. A 
common way of describing their relationship is as follows: “Science 
progresses while law builds slowly on precedent. Science assumes 
that humankind is determined by some combination of nature and 
nurture, while law assumes that humankind can transcend these 
influences and exercise free will. Science is a cooperative endeavor, 
while most legal institutions operate on an adversary model.”162 
With regard to law’s use of science to shape the criminal 
process, one key issue is how non-scientists (i.e., most lawyers and 
jurors) handle scientific evidence. Unfortunately, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that neither cohort, generally, handles such 
evidence very well. These groups generally have “little 
understanding of the product they are buying.”163 This lack of 
understanding is particularly problematic because courts reject 
 
 158.  FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 26. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Alex R. Hess, Book Review, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 1 (2009) (reviewing ROBIN 
FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009)). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 56. 
 163.  Id. at 53. 
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challenges to fingerprint identification evidence largely on the 
basis that the adversarial process (i.e., defense counsel) exposes 
issues with fingerprint identification evidence via cross-examination 
and jurors will make appropriate assessments about the accuracy 
and weight of such evidence.164 
A. Lawyers and Scientific Evidence 
Relying on the lawyer’s ability to cross-examine is problematic 
for various reasons. First, lawyers are generally not scientists.165 As 
Professor Faigman stated, “Not only do they not have training in 
the particular subject [of science], they have a more profound 
disability: most . . . lack the ability to judge whether proffered 
research is good science, bad science, or science at all.”166 Professor 
Fredric Lederer noted “lawyers generally lack significant scientific 
training. This educational deficiency often places lawyers at a 
disadvantage when confronted with scientific evidence . . . . 
[L]awyers . . . often fail to ask the right questions and uncritically 
accept scientific assertions.”167 The NAS Report recognized this was 
a significant issue too, stating over ten times that “lawyers and 
judges often have insufficient training and background in scientific 
methodology, and they often fail to fully comprehend the 
approaches employed by different forensic science disciplines and 
the reliability of forensic science evidence that is offered in trial.”168 
Lawyers can overlook even the most accessible and vital 
information as a consequence of an inability to engage with 
science. Michael Saks gave the following example: 
The [NAS] was asked by the FBI to evaluate voice 
spectrography used for the purpose of identifying 
suspects, and the Academy assembled a diverse and first-
rate panel of experts to examine the scientific evidence 
on the question. The Academy published a detailed 
report of their conclusions, which the FBI promptly 
adverted to. Lawyers in trials around the country failed to 
 
 164.  See supra Sections III.A–.B. 
 165.  See supra Sections III.A–.B. 
 166.  FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 54. 
 167.  Fredric I. Lederer, Scientific Evidence—An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 517, 519–20 (1984). 
 168.  See Jessica D. Gabel, Forensiphilia: Is Public Fascination with Forensic Science a 
Love Affair or Fatal Attraction?, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 233, 
236 (2010) (citing NAS Report, supra note 9, at 27). 
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find and bring the report to the attention of judges, 
judges failed to find the report, and several courts which 
clearly knew of the report failed to learn from it.169 
Saks concluded that “the adversary process failed to motivate 
lawyers to find and offer the most important evidence on the 
subject at issue.”170 These deficiencies are often attributed to a 
science and math “black hole in legal education—a black hole that 
becomes harder to close the more removed it is from law school.”171 
Consequently, as Professor Jessica Gabel stated, “As lawyers, we are 
ill-equipped to speak the language of science.”172 
Second, defense counsel often has limited resources. The 
availability of resources is an important dimension to the discussion 
surrounding the restriction of post-conviction review on the basis of 
incentivizing defense counsel to perform effectively at trial.173 As 
Kim explained, however, “Although this reasoning is persuasive in 
the abstract, as a practical matter, reducing the number of trial 
errors would generally require attorneys to spend more time and 
resources representing each client.”174 Most attorneys already ration 
the time they have with each client, so although restricted post-
conviction review may make defense counsel want to provide 
enhanced representation, it “will generally have little effect on the 
actual representation they provide.”175 Forensic experts can be 
expensive to hire and their applications can be time-consuming.176 
Counsel cannot “magic up” these resources (along with an 
adequate scientific knowledge to engage competently with the 
expert) simply because post-conviction review is limited. 
Third, the adversarial system itself is limited. By “confronting 
jurors with counter-scenarios and competing arguments, the 
adversarial processes are supposed to provide an effective antidote 
 
 169.  Saks, supra note 1, at 1137. 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Gabel, supra note 168, at 257–58. 
 172.  Id. at 258. 
 173.  Kim, supra note 17, at 564. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 126 
(2008) (“Our system of criminal review certainly does not privilege factual claims. 
Locating an alibi witness, obtaining experts to challenge forensic evidence or 
undermine eyewitness identifications, or presenting evidence of defendants’ lack 
of capacity requires substantial resources and time.”).  
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to heuristic biases” involved in forensic evidence.177 Heuristic biases 
are defined as “unconscious cognitive tendencies to oversimplify 
the evaluation of uncertain probabilities in all facets of decision 
making.”178 These biases can explain why jurors tend to overvalue 
“big matches” (between a latent print and a suspect print) and 
undervalue “small non-matches.”179 As explained below, if an expert 
testifies that there is a “match,” jurors tend to infer a higher 
probability that the defendant was the source of the suspect 
evidence.180 
However, several researchers argue adversarial procedures do 
not provide effective antidotes to such biases. There are two main 
reasons for this: 
First, even experts trained to recognize the ill-effects of 
cognitive biases unwittingly succumb to them. We should 
not assume, therefore, that lawyers are immune and can 
effectively wean jurors from these errors. Even if both 
sides are equally prone to mistakes, there is no reason to 
expect the mistakes as a whole to neutralize each other in 
regard to the search for the truth in a given case.181 
Second, the state and defense “are unlikely to be similarly 
situated in relation to representativeness, simulation, confirmation, 
certainty, [or] uniqueness.”182 For example, a party with a 
fingerprint or other “big” supporting evidence may have a heuristic 
bias advantage. 
Even if the other side has an equally strong case . . . if 
making that case requires aggregation of the weight of 
many bits of “small” evidence, that party will get no 
uniqueness bounce and instead will be disadvantaged by 
multiple irrelevance fallacies. . . . [T]ogether with the 
various heuristic fallacies, the state’s monopoly over 
crime-scene evidence and first crack at key witnesses 
causes exactly this uneven distribution of advantages to 
 
 177.  Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 650. 
 178.  Id. at 624.  
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael Saks, Communicating Opinion 
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 
1159, 1165 (2008). 
 181.  Liebman et al., supra note 5, at 650. 
 182.  Id. at 650–51. 
28
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss2/8
8. Cooper_CP (756-790) (Do Not Delete) 5/2/2016  9:26 PM 
784 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:756 
recur, systematically favoring the prosecution over the 
defense.183 
Moreover, research suggests that cross-examination and 
rebuttal witnesses do not necessarily dilute the impact of such 
testimony, especially testimony suggesting or stating 
“individualization” given by experts. Scholars have explained that, 
“unfortunately, cross-examination and the use of opposing experts 
do not appear to effectively counter expert testimony, regardless of 
the logical vulnerability of the initial expert testimony.”184 Professor 
Beecher-Monas has reported similar finding in mock jury studies: 
For example, in mock jury studies about the effectiveness 
of cross-examination, it apparently made little difference 
whether the defense challenged the expert testimony; 
whether the defense pointed out in cross examination 
that the expert’s conclusions were inconsistent with prior 
research and that the expert had not followed standard 
methodology; whether the defense not only cross-
examined the prosecution expert, but also put on its own 
expert. Although the jurors discussed the expert evidence 
in their deliberations, and although there was a strong 
correlation between the prosecution expert’s testimony 
and the jury’s verdict preferences, the results did not vary 
among the first three conditions.185 
As a result, the adversarial process does not guarantee a cure 
for “shaky” expert forensic evidence. In light of these points, the 
courts’ reliance on defense counsel is perhaps too optimistic. Many 
lawyers are likely to be tackling fingerprint identification cases with 
“blunt tools,” including their own restricted scientific knowledge 
and ability to engage with scientific evidence, limited resources, 
and a low-impact and/or depleted adversarial arsenal. Courts 
should recognize these limitations when considering challenges to 
fingerprint identification evidence. Before restricting post-
conviction review (or other motions) on the basis that counsel 
should “get it right the first time,” courts should recognize that is 
likely impossible to do. 
 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 180, at 1189. 
 185.  Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark 
Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1407 (2009). 
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B. Jurors and Scientific Evidence 
The courts’ approach to challenges to fingerprint evidence 
also relies heavily on jurors. At present, the courts’ approach 
appears to assume that jurors can evaluate such evidence accurately 
with ease. This assumption, however, neglects a meaningful 
assessment of how scientific evidence impacts jurors and how jurors 
digest scientific evidence. Trial courts’ trust in jurors to evaluate 
such evidence accurately might well be misplaced. Like lawyers, the 
vast majority of jurors are not scientists.186 Consequently, many have 
difficulty engaging with scientific evidence accurately, and, in 
particular, determining the appropriate weight to afford to specific 
evidence.187 There is ample evidence that jurors consider forensic 
evidence “especially critical to their ultimate decision about 
guilt,”188 have a thirst for scientific evidence,189 and expect to see it, 
“particularly in cases where the majority of evidence is 
circumstantial.”190 Research has also found that jurors have inflated 
expectations of science.191 As such, their ability to attach 
appropriate weight to forensic identification evidence is 
questionable. 
This is an especially relevant consideration in forensic 
identification cases given that the ability of many forensic 
disciplines (including that of friction ridge analysis) to make 
“matches” has come under fire in recent years, and since 2005, 
there has been a move towards curtailing expert testimony by some 
courts.192 For example, McQuiston-Surrett and Saks conducted a 
 
 186.  FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 53. 
 187.  See Valeria P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 19, 
23 (2007) (stating that jurors can have difficulty understanding scientific and 
technical evidence, particularly DNA evidence). 
 188.  Pete Frick, Forensic Science in Court: Challenges in the Twenty-First Century, 27 
SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 145, 156 (2012); see also DONALD E. SHELTON, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN COURT: CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 102 (2011). 
 189.  Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands 
Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
331, 333 (2006) (discussing how jurors have high expectations that scientific 
evidence will be presented at criminal trials—expectations that translate into 
“demands for scientific evidence as a condition of guilt”). 
 190.  Frick, supra note 188, at 157. 
 191.  Shelton et al., supra note 189, at 333. 
 192.  This has mostly been the case in firearms identification evidence cases. 
See Collision of Law and Science, supra note 9, at 287 (“A number of American courts 
have changed their approach to the admissibility of firearms identification 
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study examining the impact on jurors of variations in the 
presentation of a forensic expert’s findings.193 The study varied the 
language and concepts by which the expert communicated the 
results of his examination that related to the forensic discipline of 
microscopic hair comparisons.194 The study found that jurors 
inferred a higher probability that the defendant was the source of 
the crime scene hair when the expert testimony was presented in 
the form of a “match,” “similar-in-all-microscopic-characteristics,” 
or as an objective single-probability, than when it was presented in 
a subjective-probability or objective multiple-frequency format.195 It 
also found that the evidence had a significant impact on the juror’s 
determination of guilt.196 The study showed that jurors often 
deferred to the opinion of experts when expert opinions were 
presented as a final conclusion about the evidence presented.197 
Jurors became more likely to find liability from “subjective 
probability” if expert opinions were presented in the form of 
definitive conclusions.198 The study further revealed that jurors had 
difficulties “understanding statistical, and especially probability, 
data,” and that they “underutilize[d] such information.”199 
Interestingly, this study also found that judges were less influenced 
by the expert’s testimony than jurors, and arrived at lower 
probability estimates that the defendant was the source of the 
crime scene evidence.200 Such findings raise the possibility of 
whether judges substitute their own ability (and assessment of the 
evidence) for that of jurors, and are therefore overly trusting of 
jurors’ ability to employ appropriate scrutiny to forensic evidence 
and afford it appropriate weight. 
 
evidence between 2004 and 2011. All of the aforementioned cases (except 
Santiago, Hicks, and Natson) have moved firearms examiners away from making 
claims of individualization by restricting them to specific terminology and phrases, 
which allegedly reflect less absolute conclusions.”). Some courts have curtailed 
fingerprint identification evidence too, however. See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 
933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.2 (Mass. 2010); supra Part II. 
 193.  McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 180, at 1165. 
 194.  Id. at 1164. 
 195.  Id. at 1165. 
 196.  Id. at 1165–66. 
 197.  Id. at 1188. 
 198.  Id. at 1188–89. 
 199.  Id. at 1189. 
 200.  Id. at 1188–89. 
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Courts’ decisions in labeling fingerprint identification heard 
by jurors (rightly or wrongly) as “harmless” also raise this 
concern.201 For instance, in Illinois v. Morris, Morris appealed his 
first-degree murder conviction, arguing that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request an admissibility hearing regarding 
the fingerprint evidence against him.202 The state’s expert testified 
that a palm print recovered from a bloody shovel found at the 
crime scene matched Morris’ palm print.203 The court rejected his 
argument, reasoning that he did not suffer prejudice because, even 
without the fingerprint evidence, “there was still overwhelming 
evidence that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”204 This 
other evidence included that Morris was angry and acted 
aggressively towards the victim, he was observed leaving the victim’s 
house just prior to the discovery of the murder, and that the blood 
on his clothing matched the victim’s DNA profile. Somewhat 
similarly, in 2014, in Abdul-Salaam v. Beard, the appellant appealed 
his convictions for multiple violent offenses, claiming recent 
scientific developments undermined the “reliability and 
admissibility of [the] fingerprint evidence” against him.205 The state 
presented evidence that his prints “matched” a print found on an 
extension cord wrapper at the crime scene.206 In rejecting the 
argument, the court stated: 
Appellant’s argument conveniently overlooks that even in 
the absence of such fingerprint evidence, there was 
 
 201.  This judicial “trend” is very noticeable in post-conviction challenges to 
firearms identification evidence cases. In those cases, courts are relying on another 
value of finality; namely, the prevention of non-controversial claims flooding the 
system. A review of firearms appeals cases shows that courts often conclude the 
admission of “[firearms identification] evidence at trial [i]s ‘non-prejudicial’ in 
light of other evidence against the defendant. In other words, courts are terming 
the (legally sound or unsound) admission of firearms identification evidence as 
non-controversial.” Challenges to Firearms Identification, supra note 20, at 458–60. 
Again, this rationale arguably overlooks the impact scientific evidence has on 
jurors, with numerous studies showing jurors place special trust in experts and 
scientific evidence. Moreover, studies have shown jurors to rate firearms 
examiners as among the most honest, competent, and influential experts. It also 
overlooks the complications jurors have in relation to understanding such 
evidence. See id. 
 202.  Illinois v. Morris, 997 N.E.2d 847, 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 203.  Id. at 850. 
 204.  Id. at 872. 
 205.  Abdul-Salaam v. Beard, 16 F. Supp. 3d 420, 466 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 206.  Id. 
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overwhelming eyewitness testimony placing Appellant at 
the scene of the crime. At least four persons who were at 
the scene of the crime testified that Appellant shot the 
police officer. Thus, even if we were to accept Appellant’s 
argument regarding the fingerprint evidence, Appellant is 
simply unable to show that the evidence would have 
altered the outcome of the trial.207 
“[R]esearch suggests that statements made by experts are 
given considerable deference by jurors and their impact is unlikely 
to be undone either through cross-examination or rebuttal 
witnesses.”208 It is even suggested that jurors feel more inclined to 
credit an expert’s testimony when subjected to vigorous cross-
examination and more skeptical about the reliability of a 
defendant’s rebuttal evidence. As one study concluded: 
One might have expected an explication of the 
examination process, emphasizing the guesswork 
involved, would have a sobering effect on fact finders, but 
it appears instead to lead fact finders to be more 
impressed by the examination. Similarly, since most jurors 
begin with an exaggerated view of the nature and 
capabilities of forensic identification, one might expect 
that information explicitly informing fact finders about 
the limitations of the expertise would temper the jurors’ 
inferences. Such information had little effect on jurors’ 
judgments.209 
Moreover jurors are not presented with the full picture. 
Instead, juries “hear highly practiced alternative stories that only 
roughly approximate what might be termed reality.”210 In terms of 
expert testimony, because of the adversarial model, “information 
that reaches the legal system [and hence the jury] does not 
represent the scientific field more generally.”211 Very often, jurors 
are presented with experts at the “margins of their disciplines” who 
are “chosen . . . because they are willing to be . . . more certain of 
 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic 
Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1206 (2010). 
 209.  McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 180, at 1188. 
 210.   FAIGMAN, supra note 26, at 65. 
 211.  Id. at 54. 
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their conclusions.”212 This approach gives jurors the impression that 
the relevant scientific field is more polarized than it actually is.213 
In light of this, trial courts’ trust in jurors to assess fingerprint 
identification evidence accurately and place appropriate weight on 
such evidence is also, arguably, too optimistic. Fingerprint evidence 
has a persuasive impact on already science-thirsty jurors, who find 
comfort in expert certainty and have general difficulties with 
engaging in scientific evidence accurately. Courts should recognize 
this when considering challenges to fingerprint identification 
evidence. Before restricting post-conviction review (or other 
motions) on the basis that such evidence is best judged by the jury, 
courts should give more meaningful consideration to the problems 
jurors face when confronted by scientific evidence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fingerprint identification evidence has been admitted into 
U.S. courtrooms for over a century. The NAS Report breathed life 
into cases where defendants had been convicted in whole or in part 
by fingerprint evidence. Between 2009 and 2014, many defendants 
have argued (with and without using the Report) that fingerprint 
identification evidence is unreliable and should not have been 
admitted against them. Despite concerns about the discipline’s 
ability to engage in individualization, however, courts continue to 
strongly favor the admission of fingerprint identification evidence, 
including claims of, or akin to, individualization. Case law 
examined in this article shows that there is a general trend by 
courts to rely on the adversary process to remedy concerns about 
the reliability of fingerprint evidence. By focusing on the filtering 
effects of the adversary process, and in particular the role of 
defense counsel, as a basis for rejecting challenges to the veracity of 
fingerprint evidence, the courts have been relying upon the key 
finality interest of incentivizing defense counsel to prevent errors at 
trial level. This rationale, however, is problematic. 
This article argues that by rationalizing their decisions in this 
way, judges are overlooking important difficulties both lawyers and 
jurors have in relation to engaging with forensic identification 
evidence. It is likely that defense counsels are tackling fingerprint 
identification evidence with “blunt tools,” including their own 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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scientific knowledge and ability to engage with scientific evidence 
accurately, limited resources, and a low-impact and/or depleted 
adversarial arsenal. Moreover, research shows that jurors are drawn 
towards alleged expert certainty, have inflated expectations of 
science, and also have general difficulties with engaging in 
scientific evidence accurately. As a result, jurors generally struggle 
to assess forensic identification evidence and afford it appropriate 
weight. 
Professor Murphy recently concluded that by choosing “finality 
at all costs,” the criminal justice system is “destined to court either 
scandal or injustice, and perhaps both.”214 This statement should 
resonate in cases involving challenges to forensic identification 
evidence, given nearly half of the now over 330 post-conviction 
DNA evidence exonerations in America are attributable, in some 
way, to invalidated and/or improper forensic evidence.215 In light of 
this, and the points raised in this article, the courts should consider 
taking new perspectives on finality in such cases, and give more 
meaningful consideration to the issues that arise when law 
consumes science in this way. 
 
 214.  Murphy, supra note 18, at 672. 
 215.  For an excellent discussion about the intersection of innocence and 
finality, see CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA, supra note 8. 
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